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Abstract 
Scholars have offered important critiques of the socio-spatial processes of contemporary 
technological development, including the rise of “smart city” urban development models. While 
these critiques have been essential for understanding contemporary forms of techno-capitalism 
and its reach into new areas, this paper calls for a consideration of alternative modes of digital 
development in urban life beyond the logics of securitization and capital accumulation. In 
particular, I examine the critical discourses and experimental practices of a grassroots movement 
focused on claiming “technological sovereignty” (TS) in Barcelona. The TS movement is a 
broad, de-centralized network of cooperatives, associations, and community initiatives 
experimenting with alternative practices of locally-rooted, open-source digital development. 
These groups explore democratic and cooperative practices of work, property, production, and 
consumption in relation to digital technology, based around an ethics of care and a commitment 
to working through and within local communities. In examining the values, beliefs, and practices 
of the TS movement, I bring ongoing discussions around digitalization and the “smart city” into 
critical conversation with the extensive literature on prefigurative urban politics and 
postcapitalist economies.  
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1.   Introduction 
In the past several years, geography has seen the rapid growth of interest in questions around 
digital technologies, including robots (Del Casino 2016), big data (Kitchin 2014), algorithms 
(Crampton 2016; Amoore 2018), social networks (Shelton, Poorthuis, and Zook 2015), and the 
new spatial forms to which they give rise—the smart city (Kitchin 2015), the smart border 
(Amoore 2006), and “code/space” (Kitchin and Dodge 2011). Geographers have been well 
positioned to offer insightful and necessary critiques of the ways these technologies reshape 
dominant epistemologies, relationships of power, and spatial practices, while highlighting the 
agentive capacities of technological objects and systems (Ash, Kitchin, and Leszczynski 2018).  
 Yet, this growing body of scholarship has given less attention to the question of 
alternatives—alternative digital economies, alternative spatial forms, alternative understandings 
of what technology is or might be. In much of this scholarship, emerging technologies are 
developed and controlled by state, military, and/or corporate actors; and indeed, this is the 
hegemonic model of technological development today—driven by the sometimes convergent and 
sometimes conflicting desires of the State for new forms of security, surveillance, and control, 
and by private firms’ drive for profit.  
 If, as much of the digital geographies literature has argued, we need to recognize 
emerging technologies as inherently political and entangled in power-laden socio-technical 
assemblages, then what might an aspirational postcapitalist politics (Gibson-Graham 2006) of 
digital technology look like? What kinds of radical political possibilities arise from the ongoing 
co-evolution of technics and humanity (Stiegler 2013)? If urban algorithmic governance is 
constituted through “material-discursive projects of ‘future-ing’” (Leszczynski 2016, 1691) 
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based on logics of securitization, what alternative projects of ‘future-ing’ exist or might exist? 
Based on what logics and values? 
 This paper explores the question of alternative modes of digital development in urban 
life. In particular, I explore the discourses and practices of a grassroots movement in Barcelona 
organized around the notion of “technological sovereignty” and devoted to claiming radical 
democratic control over processes of technological development. The movement experiments 
with alternative economic practices and forms of organization for digital production and 
consumption. These practices are driven by an ethics of care and deeply territorialized in the city 
and local community—seeing technological sovereignty as a way to “rethink the model of the 
city” (SobTec 2016 website, accessed 17 December 2018).  
 In exploring the values, beliefs, and practices of this movement, I bring geographic 
discussions on processes of digitalization and the “smart city” into critical conversation with 
work on urban political movements and alternative economies. I build on previous work on 
grassroots urban movements that aim to radically remake the socio-political and economic 
relations of the city by enacting alternative practices—a kind of prefigurative politics of 
grassroots city-making (Davidson and Ivseson 2015; Wanzer-Serrano 2015; Gray 2017); and I 
highlight the importance of exploring the possibilities for alternative economic arrangements and 
practices based on post-capitalist logics (Gibson-Graham 2006; Diprose 2017; Zanoni et al 2017; 
Healy et al 2018). Following previous geographic research on such “diverse economies,” I aim to 
bring “marginalized, hidden and alternative economic activities to light in order to make them 
more real and more credible as objects of policy and activism” (Gibson-Graham 2008). 
 The goal of this paper is to move from a standpoint of critique to a position of openness 
toward the possibilities for alternative, counter-hegemonic (Laclau and Mouffe 1985) modes of 
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digital development in (re)producing urban life. Existing initiatives of activist and hacker 
collectives around the world offer glimpses of alternatives. The Free and Open Source Software 
(F/OSS) movement has long struggled against the privatization of technological knowledge, 
working to build a digital software commons through alternative regimes of labor and property 
(Söderberg 2015), while “hacktivist” movements work to disrupt the functions of state and 
capitalist technological apparatuses (Coleman 2013). A report by the group Derechos Digitales 
(2017) documents projects around Latin America devoted to building common digital 
infrastructures, free software, and feminist technology often through social movements and 
cooperative enterprises; while two dossiers from the Calafou Postcapitalist Eco-Industrial 
District near Barcelona offer examples from around the world of self-managed servers, 
biohacking labs, and open-source 3D printing (Hache 2014; Hache 2017).  
 Since roughly 2014, a loose network of individuals and collectives has emerged in 
Barcelona organized around the notion of “technological sovereignty.” This community is 
focused on distinct projects and initiatives building community-based technological systems and 
services with social objectives. The movement is particularly interesting for the wide variety of 
projects with strong territorial ties to the city—from community-managed broadband 
infrastructure, autonomous servers, and an open source Internet of Things network, to free 
software cooperatives and spaces for public education and collective reflection. Each year since 
2016 a group of activists has organized the “Technological Sovereignty Congress”—or 
SobTec—while global justice NGO, SETEM-Catalunya, has organized the Mobile Social 
Congress featuring “technological sovereignty” as a primary theme. Increasingly the language of 
“technological sovereignty” can be found in the manifestos and websites of many local 
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cooperatives and associations, and is frequently evoked in public events, debates, training 
courses, and workshops.  
 Below, I offer a brief discussion of methods and then introduce the TS movement, 
situating it in the context of contemporary Barcelona. In the following section, I review existing 
literature on the “smart city” and processes of digital innovation in cities, highlighting the lack of 
discussion around alternative modes of development. I then place this literature in relation to 
scholarship on prefigurative urban politics and alternative economies. The remainder of the 
paper is divided into two main sections. Section 3 examines TS actors’ critiques of the 
hegemonic model of technological development and their theorization of “technological 
sovereignty” as an alternative. Section 4 explores the practices and strategies for pursuing TS, 
focusing on the movement’s experimentation with alternative models of economic organization, 
practices of care, its territorialization in Barcelona and relationship to the municipal government.   
 
1.1 Methods  
This paper is based on over a year of fieldwork carried out in Barcelona between 2016 and 2018. 
During this time, I conducted participant observation with several TS-related initiatives and 
attended public events related to technology politics in the city, including the Smart City Expo, 
Mobile Week Barcelona, the Mobile Social Forum, and the Technological Sovereignty Congress 
(SobTec). I participated in several digital forums focused around TS on platforms like Telegram, 
Signal, and Riot. I also conducted more than 20 interviews with individuals involved in TS 
initiatives and collected and analyzed pamphlets, promotional materials, flyers, and other 
documents related to TS. Most interviews were conducted in Catalan, while others were 
conducted in Spanish. Events and meetings were typically conducted in Catalan and Spanish, as 
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well as occasionally English. I am fluent in all three languages and all translations throughout the 
paper are my own.  
 
1.2 Technological Sovereignty in Barcelona  
The movement for technological sovereignty represents a confluence of multiple historical and 
contemporary influences in Barcelona. The movement partially emerges as a reaction to the 
intensification of capitalist technological development models in the city. Beginning in 2011, 
then-Mayor Xavier Trias sought to turn Barcelona into a premier “smart city,” partnering with 
multi-national firms like IBM and Cisco to experiment with “smart” technologies for urban 
management (March and Ribera-Fumaz 2016). Barcelona also became the host of the annual 
Smart City World Expo and the Mobile World Congress—holding the title of “Mobile World 
Capital.”  
 Yet, the city is also home to an extensive activist community that has mobilized in 
opposition to corporate globalization, neoliberalism, and austerity—including the 15M protests 
and occupations of 2011 (Perugorria and Tejerina 2013; Antentas 2013) and the counter-
globalization movement of the late 1990’s and early 2000’s (Juris 2010). The particular 
manifestations of these movements in Barcelona are rooted historically in the city’s anarchist 
movements of the late 19th and early 20th century (Ealham 2010). Barcelona has also been an 
active hub of activity in the Free Knowledge movement (Fuster Morell 2012; Fuster Morell et al 
2015) and hacker movements, and boasts an extensive solidarity economy sector rooted in 
historical traditions of cooperativism in Catalonia (Miro and Fernandez 2016). Finally, the 
growth and evolution of the movement for Catalan independence from Spain has increasingly 
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prompted critical debates over the nature of democracy and sovereignty and the failures and 
abuses of current forms of state power and capitalist development (Benitez Romero et al 2017).  
 The TS community is composed of a diverse range of initiatives, from those focused on 
infrastructure, hardware, and software development, to the provision of technical services and 
the promotion of reuse and recycling (see Figure 1). For instance, Guifinet is a decentralized 
network of community associations and volunteers that build and maintain their own broadband 
internet infrastructure, managing their own servers, laying fiber optic cables, and relaying signals 
through a series of antennas and routers. The network is the largest such “community wireless 
network” in the world, with over 35,000 active nodes. The Things Network (TTN) builds a 
community-managed Internet of Things sensor network through the Guifinet infrastructure.  
 Small worker cooperatives—including Jamgo, Colectic, Adab1ts, Dabne, Coopdevs, and 
Lliuretic—develop open-source software and technical services for local businesses, often in the 
broader Solidarity Economy Network. Meanwhile, eReuse and Alencop promote the responsible 
reuse and recycling of digital devices. Other cooperatives in the housing, mobility, food, and 
service sectors experiment with forms of “platform cooperativism” (Scholz 2014)—using open 
source technologies to innovate and coordinate broader cooperative economies. Cooperation 
across these groups is common, pooling resources, skills, and knowledge in pursuit of shared 
projects. Such is the case of the CommonsCloud Alliance in which multiple groups coordinated 
through the cooperative FemProcomuns collaborate to create a commonly-managed cloud 
infrastructure. There are also multiple initiatives focused on community education and training, 
and creating spaces for collective reflection and theorization, as discussed above.  
  
Figure 1: TS Initiatives 
Area of Action Groups, Projects, and Initiatives 
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Infrastructure and Hardware Guifinet et al, The Things Network, CommonCloud, 
Equipaments Lliures, Mar de Bits, Ateneus de Fabricacio 
Software and Services Coopdevs, Jamgo, Colectic, Adab1ts, Dabne, LliureTIC, 
Barcelona Free Software 
Reuse and Recycling eReuse.org/reutilitza.cat, Alencop 
Cross-Sector Economic Activity Katuma, SomMobilitat, Riders por Derechos, Voki Voki, 
SomConexio, Pangea, ITC Commission of XES 
Education and Training Colectic, ExO, Ateneus de Fabricacio, La Comunificadora, 
Alencoop, Smart Citizen/DECODE, Smart Barris, 
Universitat Lliure de Sants, Dimmons (Digital Commons 
Research Group, Open University of Barcelona) 





2. Digital Geographies and Alternative Futures 
I situate the following discussion of the TS movement in relation to recent geographic 
scholarship on processes of technological change and the emergence of new digital technologies 
in urban life. I argue that the TS movement demonstrates the possibilities for alternative modes 
of digital development—a topic that has been thus far neglected in most digital geographies 
literature focused on critiques of the dominant model. To think through the possibilities for 
alternatives, I position the TS movement in relation to two existing areas of geographic 
scholarship: the extensive literatures on grassroots, prefigurative urban politics and alternative 
economies.  
2.1 Digital Geographies and the “Smart City” 
 The past several years have seen the rapid expansion of geographic scholarship focused 
on the proliferation of digital technologies and their widespread impacts across economies, 
governance, social life, and geographic inquiry itself (Ash, Kitchin, and Leszczynski 2018). 
Much of the emergent scholarship in digital geographies has focused on the “smart city”—the 
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increased use of complex assemblages of digital infrastructures, data, and algorithms in the 
governance of cities (Kitchin 2015). Scholars have offered careful explanations of the operations 
and forms of agency exercised by increasingly connected, “smart” infrastructures and devices, 
and their roles in producing urban space (Dodge et al 2005) and delivering vital services 
(Goldsmith and Crawford 2014; Albino et al 2015).  
 Within this literature there have been continual calls to politicize the smart city. 
Geographers have offered insightful critiques the smart city as a techno-capitalist model of 
entrepreneurial urban governance (Wiig 2015; Luque-Ayala and Marvin 2015), and as a new 
form of securitization, surveillance and control (Vanolo 2014; Klauer et al 2014; Leszczynski; 
Shaw 2016). Others have examined how digital media and devices “augment” the experience of 
urban spaces, mediating relationships of power (Graham et al 2013). While scholars explore the 
possibilities for “citizen participation” in smart city initiatives, they have often found very 
limited and constrained forms of participation in practice (Tenney and Sieber 2016; Cardullo and 
Kitchin 2018), highlighting the ways smart city programs turn political issues of urban 
governance into problems with “technical” solutions. Citizen participation becomes constrained 
by techno-solutionist logics. Despite these critiques, there have been fewer attempts to consider 
what alternative, more democratic, and socially-just alternatives might look like.  
 In her critique of this literature, Rose (2017) has argued that most discussions on the 
“digitally-mediated city” have failed to fully theorize posthuman agency, focusing instead on the 
agential capabilities of digital devices and infrastructures. She calls on geographers to 
“reconfigure their understanding of digitally mediated cities and acknowledge both the 
reinventiveness and the diversity of urban posthuman agency” (Rose 2017: 789). By highlighting 
the possibilities for urban residents to enact different forms of “spatial and temporal organization 
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of practices and meanings” (Rose 2017: 787), Rose gestures toward to the possibilities for 
exploring alternative techno-social relations in the city. More explicitly, Elwood and 
Leszczynski (2018: 640) have recently called for “feminist digital geographies” to explore the 
“possibilities of a liberatory digital politics for re-making our technologies and ourselves as 
digital subjects.” Along this vein, I argue that the TS movement in Barcelona offers an example 
of how urban residents can exercise political agency through forms of creative experimentation 
with digital technologies—performing alternative economic practices and enacting forms of 
radical democracy against the “post-political” turn in urban governance.  
2.2 Prefigurative Urban Politics and Alternative Economies 
The de-politicization of key aspects of urban life through the implementation of “smart city” 
models is just the latest in a long succession of “post-political” urban policy agendas focused on 
making cities “competitive, global, secure, and sustainable” (Davidson and Iveson 2015: 544). 
MacLeod (2011), Swyngedouw (2011), and others have examined how urban policymaking has 
become increasingly shaped by the production and policing of consensus as opposed to the 
“dissensus” or agonism seen by many as key to robust urban democracy (Staeheli 2010). This 
constructed consensus as to what constitutes good urban governance allows for the rise of 
technocracy—as experts are brought in to implement global “best practices” and the space of 
democratic debate is continually constrained.   
 In opposition to such “post-political” logics, several scholars have recently explored the 
possibilities for enacting radical alternatives—reclaiming the city as the space of democratic 
politics (Iveson 2014; Davidson and Iveson 2015). While some of this literature has examined 
large-scale mobilizations reclaiming urban space for protest (Staeheli 2013), others have focused 
on examples of prefigurative urban politics—enacting the social, political, and economic 
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changes the activists wish to see, beyond petitioning the state for rights (Ince 2012). In an 
historical case from the 1970’s, Gray (2017) examines the autonomous Marxist “Take over the 
City” movements in Italy, presenting their direct “territorial autogestion” as a more radical 
alternative to rights-based discourses. In a similar way, Wanzer-Serrano (2015) examines the 
case of the Young Lords in Spanish Harlem in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s, a liberation 
movement demanding community control over local institutions and land. In a more 
contemporary example, Bunce (2016) describes the East London Community Land Trust as a 
political strategy for challenging capitalist development models and creating new “urban 
commons.” This literature stresses the material and spatial relations of the city as key to enacting 
such alternative futures—reclaiming radical democratic control over the common infrastructures 
on which urban residents depend and the common spaces in which they live. In many cities 
around the world, these common infrastructures and spaces are increasingly controlled, 
augmented, or mediated by digital technologies.  
 Such prefigurative politics have also been at the heart of geographic literature on various 
kinds of “community economies” (Roelvink et al 2015). This work explores the possibilities for 
creating alternative economic practices beyond or in opposition to the hegemonic capitalist order 
(Bauwens 2005; Gibson-Graham 2006; Benkler 2006; Stiegler 2014). Gibson-Graham (2006) 
develop a vocabulary of economic diversity, recognizing the multiplicity of existing and possible 
arrangements for organizing economic activity. Activists around the world have theorized and 
experimented with alternative “solidarity economy” initiatives (Allard and Davidson 2008), 
while scholars across disciplines have examined processes of creating new “commons” (Healy et 
al 2018). All of this literature considers how relationships of production, consumption, 
labor/work, and property are reconfigured through experimentation with alternative economic 
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models guided by notions of autonomy, solidarity, equality, and care (Diprose 2017). While the 
“community economies” literature in geography has engaged little with the possibilities offered 
by digital technologies, others have examined the alternative models of production and 
consumption in the free software movement (Söderberg 2015) and the broader possibilities for 
commons-based modes of peer production made possible through the internet (Bauwens 2005; 
Benkler and Nissenbaum 2006).  
 Like the movements for radical urban democracy discussed above, diverse economy 
movements contest hegemonic visions of the future and actively work to build alternatives 
through grassroots forms of organization and experimentation. I draw on both bodies of literature 
in approaching the TS movement in Barcelona. I describe the movement as a network of 
prefigurative projects collectively theorizing and experimenting with alternative political 
economic models of digital production and consumption to re-produce and re-make urban life.  
 
3. From Critique to Alternative Digital Futures 
This section describes TS activists’ broad critiques of the hegemonic model of technological 
development, and then examines the production of a discourse around “technological 
sovereignty” as a way of collectively imagining alternative digital futures. 
 
3.1 Critiquing the Techno-Capitalist Order 
 The TS movement is informed by a well-developed critique of techno-capitalism based 
on the lived experiences and observations of Barcelona-based activists. The critiques offered by 
TS activists are not directed at any particular digital technology or set of technologies, but rather 
at the political economic arrangements and techno-social relations within which such 
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technologies are produced, proliferated, and utilized in the contemporary conjuncture. 
Significantly, this approach to critique leaves open possibilities for imagining and experimenting 
with alternatives.  
 TS activists’ critiques can be organized into four related themes: the loss of control over 
technological systems, the exploitative and opaque business models of contemporary techno-
capitalism, the depoliticization and de-socialization of technological knowledge, the uneven 
geographies of technological development, and the state’s facilitation of increased surveillance. 
All of these critiques are addressed within the broader TS discourse as demonstrated by activist 
Margarita Padilla’s (2017) explanation of the driving questions behind the movement: “the 
question we wish to discuss is who has the power to make decisions about them [technologies], 
about their development, about their use, about access and about distribution, about supply and 
consumption, about the prestige they have and their power to fascinate...” 
 Many TS activists argue that as digital systems become more complex and infiltrate 
further into all aspects of life, the average person has less knowledge of them and thus less 
ability to exert control or make informed decisions about their relationship to them. As TS 
activist Chris (interview, 3 May 2018) explains: “Technology is continually more present, and 
we are continually more dependent on it. You take a cell phone and you can say, ‘I don’t know 
half of the things it is doing, and in two years when I have the next one, I’ll know even less. And 
it is going to have a greater impact on my life.’ And it will get to the point where you have 
something that you don’t recognize, and it is yourself.” This perspective is common across TS 
activists, who highlight broad concerns about losing control over key aspects of everyday life to 
techno-capitalist firms with limited accountability.  
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 TS activists take specific issue with the opaque business models of contemporary techno-
capitalism based on the exploitation of personal data and the monitoring, profiling, and 
manipulation of digitally-mediated activities. As one activist explicates: “People use Google and 
Facebook and Twitter, and it is all free. But they don’t realize that if something is free, you are 
probably the product—your data, your information, and your privacy” (interview, 16 February 
2018). The vast majority of technology users lack basic knowledge about what data are collected, 
how they are used, by whom, and toward what ends, as many of the algorithms that process such 
data are hidden from view, subject to intellectual property protections.   
 Such exploitative practices are also obscured by the discursive privileging and de-
politicization of technological knowledge. TS activists critique the division of knowledge into 
separate social and technological spheres, echoing common calls in scholarly analysis to 
recognize technologies as always situated in socio-technical milieus (Kitchin and Perng, 2016). 
For instance, Nuria explains that “technologies are ways of fulfilling some need or 
accomplishing something you want to do. They can’t be separated somehow from the rest of 
life” (interview, 21 March 2018). Margarita Padilla goes further situating technology at the heart 
of human life: “[t]echnology, from fire or flint to the monumental constructions that we use 
everywhere, almost without noticing, is the body of culture. Without technology, there would be 
no culture” (Hache 2017, 10). Recognizing this, TS activists reject the discursive framing of 
technical knowledge as a specialized and privileged field of knowledge to which only a select 
few have access—generally wealthy, white, educated men. They critique how this artificial 
division of knowledge allows for the proliferation of a singular narrative about what technology 
is and projects the future of technology as a linear progression of development divorced from 
broader social systems.  
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 This erasure of the social and political nature of technology is also an erasure of spatial 
differences. TS activists highlight the uneven spatial distribution of technological access, 
knowledge, and authority, namely the concentration of authority over technological development 
in the United States, and Silicon Valley in particular. As the world’s largest technology firms are 
located in the United States (and increasingly China), citizens in Barcelona have limited ability 
to interrogate or challenge the practices of companies that control personal data and maintain the 
infrastructures on which daily lives increasingly depend. The loss of basic technical knowledge 
also contributes to the loss of broader spatial and political knowledges, as the material and spatial 
nature of technological systems are made invisible, fading into what Thrift (2004) calls the 
“technological unconscious.” Irene reflects on this hidden geography: “You hear about the 
‘cloud’ and people think it is literally up in the air. You send an email and people think it just 
magically arrives on someone else’s computer. You don’t see that these services work through 
modems and servers that are located in particular places” (interview, 16 February 2018).  
 The TS community also critiques the ways corporate technology is increasingly adopted 
by states and municipalities. They point to Barcelona’s own experimentation with “smart city” 
and related programs as projects of surveillance and control that work to depoliticize vital 
debates over urban development processes while privatizing urban data and vital infrastructure. 
For instance, activists have fought against the implementation of T-Mobilitat—a “smartcard” 
ticketing system for public transportation—highlighting concerns about data privacy, the lack of 
transparency, and the privatization of public services. These critiques have been widely echoed 
by critical geographical scholarship on smart city projects.  
 
3.2 Theorizing Technological Sovereignty 
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Since around 2014, the notion of “technological sovereignty” has gained influence in Barcelona 
as a way of imagining and building alternatives to the hegemonic model of technological 
development. Since then TS activists have collectively theorized what technological sovereignty 
might look like in practice and how it might be pursued. Like the prefigurative politics of the 
movements discussed above, this theorization is the product of active experimentation and 
reflection. The two dossiers published by the Calafou Post-Capitalist Eco-Industrial District 
develop a theory of “technological sovereignty” based on the experiences of a range of actually-
existing open-source technology projects from around the world. The community conference 
SobTec creates a space for local initiatives to exchange ideas and reflect on their own practices 
and their politics. Other events like the Solidarity Economy Fair of Catalonia and the Mobile 
Social Congress create spaces for networking and exchange of ideas across open-source, 
community-based technology projects, out of which “technological sovereignty” emerges as a 
common organizing concept. As the working product of ongoing processes of collective 
experimentation and reflection, “technological sovereignty” is a concept with multiple meanings 
that gets taken up and enrolled in a variety of projects in different ways. Here, I offer a rough 
outline of some of the common ways TS is understood in Barcelona.  
 For many TS activists, the notion of “sovereignty” has roots in movements for food 
sovereignty, rather than direct claims on state power. In the introduction to the 2014 Soberanía 
Tecnológica dossier, Alex Hache cites the conception of food sovereignty as the basis for 
theorizing technological sovereignty, explaining that the idea was first coined by Via Campesina 
in 1996 to combat discourses of food security. Logics of food security worked to diminish 
community control over vital food systems, through a rationalization and de-socialization of food 
production and close partnerships between corporate food interests and state apparatuses. Food 
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production and distribution became a de-politicized ‘technical’ question. This juxtaposition of 
sovereignty to security is key, as many scholars have highlighted the similar logics of 
securitization on which contemporary processes of digitalization are based (Leszczynski, 2016).  
 The TS movement sits in relation to other movements in Barcelona focused on 
reclaiming energy, food, residential, cultural, and health “sovereignties.” The concept of 
“sovereignties” has become an increasingly powerful organizing concept for progressive and 
radical politics in Barcelona and beyond in recent years. The collective authors of Sobiranies 
[Sovereignties] (Benitez Romero 2017)—affiliated with the left-wing, pro-independence 
political platform Candidatura d’Unitat Popular (CUP)—present the fight for “sovereignties” as 
processes of creating direct democratic control over the vital systems and infrastructures of 
everyday life. Activists argue that these movements are fundamentally about “putting social 
reproduction under democratic control” (Benitez Romero et al 2017, 49) and promote them as a 
“proposal against capitalism” (ibid). In this sense, the notion of “sovereignties” articulates an 
alternative political economic logic and strategy in a similar way to the various alternative 
economy movements discussed above. It calls for fighting ongoing processes of neoliberalization 
not just by demanding changes to state policy, but by building new structures, relationships, and 
arrangements for meeting the population’s needs.  
 Thus, when applied to technology, the idea of sovereignty is about building alternative 
modes of developing, producing, and consuming technologies that are transparent, democratic, 
and work toward the overall goal of meeting community needs and re-producing collective life. 
Additionally, as digital technologies become increasingly important to the management of other 
vital systems—from food systems and health care, to energy and mobility—TS becomes 
essential to re-claiming broader forms of radical democratic control.  
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 While existing practices of “open-source” production are important, they do not go far 
enough. Several authors have highlighted the ambiguous politics of the open-source movement, 
and recognize the various ways open-source knowledge gets enclosed, sometimes feeding further 
capital accumulation. Further, the open-source community is rather limited, consisting of 
generally geographically dispersed individuals and groups without strong territorial ties. TS 
recognizes the importance of open-source models, while seeking ways to socialize and 
territorialize them—involving a more diverse and inclusive community and using them to 
transform broader social, political, and economic processes. As one activist commented in 2016: 
“We cannot rely only on five ‘nerds’ if we truly want to transform our relationship to technology 
and remake our city” (fieldnotes, 15 August 2016). In challenging the privileging of “technical” 
knowledge above social knowledges, TS activists also see questions of gender equity and 
broader questions of social equality as key to creating more inclusive, democratic digital 
systems.  
4. Enacting Alternative Modes of Digital Development 
The remainder of this paper examines the ways Barcelona-based actors work to create an 
alternative model of digital development in practice. I explore TS initiatives’ alternative forms of 
economic organization and then examine how these alternative models rely on everyday 
practices of care. The following section describes how these projects constitute a particularly 
urban, place-based politics, presenting the city as a key site from which to enact such 
alternatives. The final section reflects on the role of the progressive municipal government in 
promoting TS.  
 
4.1 Alternative Digital Economies 
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 TS initiatives experiment with alternative economic models, including the collaborative 
model of open-source software production, as well as commons and cooperative-based 
arrangements. These alternative models challenge traditional notions of labor and property, and 
divisions between producers and consumers, while working to democratize technological 
knowledges. 
 Technology workers’ cooperatives, like Colectic and Jamgo, offer alternative models for 
organizing work in the technology sector. While Stiegler (2014) argues that in contemporary 
“cognitive capitalism” so-called “knowledge workers” are increasingly enrolled in complex 
organizational forms that deprive them of knowledge and agency, these cooperatives implement 
horizontal forms of decision-making for organizing work processes with workers exercising 
direct control over their own knowledge. As a member of one cooperative explains: “We meet in 
an assembly each Friday to organize the work and make decisions. It can be very complicated 
and we do not always agree, but in the end, we come to collective decisions” (interview, 16 
March 2018). These cooperatives also make collective decisions about the use or investment of 
the surplus generated by their activities. In the case of Colectic, the cooperative offers digital 
services on the local market, the income from which goes to support the cooperatives’ youth 
social work programs—reinvesting in the capacities of the local community.  
 While in cooperatives such work constitutes a form of employment (cooperative self-
employment), in commons-based projects like Guifinet or TTN, “work” is a more diffuse 
concept. Such projects rely on the contributions of a wide array of local actors, from the 
neighbors who install and maintain their own antennas, sensors, or other equipment, to those 
who coordinate such projects in their neighborhoods or experiment with new equipment to 
improve the common infrastructure. This work is typically not remunerated and is instead 
 20 
inspired by a mixture of personal enjoyment, political conviction, and care for the broader 
community.  
 The economic practices also challenge traditional notions of property. Alternative notions 
of property are clear in the free software and free knowledge movements, within which code, 
designs, and other forms of “intellectual property” are shared via the internet, building a digital 
knowledge commons. This model is harnessed by actors in the TS movement, as when the 
worker cooperative Coopdevs uses code from the Open Food Network to develop the application 
for Katuma, a local agricultural consumption cooperative. As Sergi from Coopdevs explains: 
“we developed the application from the Open Food Network, adjusting it for our needs, but we 
don’t own it. We develop it with them, and the cooperative [Katuma] can do what they want with 
it. They can replace us with other developers and keep using the app. And others can take and 
use and change the app however they want” (interview, 29 January 2018). 
 Notions of property are further challenged by the practices of Guifinet and eReuse. While 
in free software development the “property” in question is intellectual property, and thus easily 
shared via the internet, in these projects property consists largely of material objects and 
infrastructure. In the case of eReuse, electronic devices are managed through “community 
licenses” in which individuals exercise a right to use devices, but are required to adhere to 
particular principles regarding the devices’ reuse and eventual disposal. Such an arrangement 
reconsiders property in its original legal sense, as a bundle of rights over a particular object—
rights that may be selectively restricted or contingent on particular actions.  
  In Guifinet, much of the infrastructure that makes up the network is private property, but 
is offered voluntarily to the common infrastructure, while other pieces of equipment may be 
owned collectively by a local association or the Guifi Foundation. The networked nature of the 
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infrastructure means that any individual piece of equipment is reliant on the broader whole. 
While I own my own antenna, router, and cables, they only function if connected to the broader 
network. This co-dependence of the material infrastructures necessarily obscures notions of 
property. While anyone is welcome to withdraw their individually-owned piece of equipment, 
that equipment loses its use-value outside of the broader network. 
 These models also blur divisions between producers and consumers. For instance, in 
GuifiAmunt, the local Guifi association for the neighborhoods of Horta and El Carmel, members 
pay five euros per month to maintain and update the shared infrastructure. Not every member 
actively participates in the maintenance of the infrastructure beyond their own home—either for 
lack of time, desire, or technical knowledge—but there are no distinctions among the association 
members. All decisions are made by consensus at monthly meetings. While some members may 
have more technical knowledge, or be more involved in the work of the project, they collectively 
decide on updates or changes to the network. In the case of Katuma, the local food cooperative is 
composed of agricultural producers, app developers, and local consumers with decisions made 
collectively among them. Such organizational forms recognize the co-dependent relationship 
between production and consumption and build democratic practices for managing that 
relationship and the various knowledges on which it is based.  
 Yet, these alternative economic practices also face challenges, including limited funding 
and their reliance on volunteer or part-time labor. As many activists point out, the business 
models of companies like Google and Facebook offer high-quality services for free, making 
profit from the exploitation of personal data. It is difficult to convince individuals, small 
companies, and even cooperatives to spend more to invest in open-source, community-based 
technologies, as the true cost of labor, materials, and maintenance of such systems are made 
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invisible in the dominant model. Activists admit that the future expansion of technological 
sovereignty depends on exploring new practices and alliances, and building greater awareness of 
the abuses of the hegemonic model within the local community.  
  
4.2 Practices of Care 
 In contrast to the logics of capital accumulation and securitization on which 
contemporary models of “governing through code” (Klauser et al 2014) rely, the TS initiatives 
are driven by an ethics of care. That is, the initiatives are not purely “economic” but are 
concerned more broadly with social development and community wellbeing; or rather, they are 
“economic” in the word’s original sense of “to take care” (Stiegler 2014). These projects rely on 
practices of care of technological objects and infrastructures, care for others, and care of the self. 
 Many TS initiatives are concerned with the care of technological systems and objects. 
This care is based on a recognition of the growing importance of these systems to everyday life 
and the need to maintain and improve them in order to support their social functions. As one 
Guifi actor explained: “Internet access isn’t a luxury anymore, it’s almost as important as having 
electricity. People rely on it to work, to communicate with family, to manage their money. So, 
we need the network to be reliable” (fieldnotes, 26 June 2016). Recognizing this, Guifi members 
organize themselves to fix technical issues when they arise and to continually improve the 
infrastructure by experimenting with and integrating innovations, like fiber optic cables.  
 This care is based on a rejection of capitalist models of programmed obsolescence and a 
series of practices meant to extend the usable life of devices and systems. eReuse coordinates the 
reuse of devices within communities until all use-value has been depleted, combatting 
“premature recycling” (Franquesa and Navarro 2018). Events like the Mobile Social Congress 
often include “Re-Start Parties” in which activists teach people how to extend the lives of their 
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devices. In Guifinet, when one piece of equipment is replaced in order to strengthen the network, 
the old equipment is moved elsewhere in the network where it can take on a new use. The 
association La Mar de Bytes makes use of second-hand and recycled equipment to maintain 
community-managed severs for web-hosting and email. Such practices are based on a 
commitment to responsibly manage collective resources, and a recognition of the social and 
environmental impacts of e-waste and mineral mining in the Global South—issues given special 
attention at the annual Mobile Social Congress.  
 TS projects are often inspired by a sense of care for others, or care for the community, 
with their primary objective to meet a social need or offer a social service. As such, many 
projects contest constructed divisions between the technical and the social, in which technical 
knowledge is privileged and value neutral. This is clear in cases like Colectic, where the 
cooperative integrates technological work with community-based social work. As cooperative 
member Nuria explains regarding their work with local youth: “Our work is to accompany youth 
in this process of learning about new technologies, so that is it not just ‘connect yourself to 
internet to watch whatever’ but to be critical and aware of how things work, what is happening 
with their data, and what these systems can be used for” (interview, 21 March 2018).   
 The Ateneus de Fabricació carry out similar work, offering public access to 3D printers 
and digital production technology with a focus on social outcomes and shared property. The 
network’s moto, “Let’s materialize ideas, let’s co-create our environment,” is based on an ethic 
of care oriented to the surrounding community and informed by a sense of being-in-common in 
urban space. Director Jordi Reynes explains that the digital production revolution will produce 
new forms of inequality and injustice, unless it is radically socialized. For this reason, the 
ateneus are staffed by both technologists and community organizers, who work to identify 
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community needs, and access to the facilities requires some form of service or contribution to the 
community in exchange.  
 Finally, TS initiatives are based around practices of care for the self, in which individuals 
cultivate deliberate and ethical relationships to technology. This is seen in the forms of 
experimentation, self-help, and knowledge-sharing common at weekly Guifilabs. For instance, at 
one event a Guifi contributor explained the process by which he created his own home 
automation system and manages it through an open source platform. Such activities represent 
forms of technological experimentation with one’s direct living environment while gaining and 
sharing new forms of knowledge. In more everyday examples, for those without formal technical 
training the use of self-help guides to install a Guifi connection involves processes of cultivating 
oneself as a technological subject and reclaiming forms of technical knowledge.  
 Events like SobTec, MSC, and community workshops also offer opportunities for 
individuals to reclaim knowledge and cultivate oneself as a digital subject. Discussions at these 
events focus on critiques of capitalist technological models, how personal data is captured and 
exploited, and the ways these systems produce certain identities and senses of self—interpolating 
subjects as consumers. In a workshop on digital political participation organized by Colectic, the 
facilitators lead group reflections on the kinds of personal data shared online and the multiple 
ways that data is captured, monetized, and exploited. This critique is coupled with an exploration 
of the alternatives produced within the TS community and the ways these alternatives offer 
greater freedom and control over personal data. Participating in these spaces acts as form of 
cultivating new subject positions. These practices continually push back against widespread 
social and cultural conventions that see technology as a specialized sphere of knowledge on 
which the “layperson” majority is not qualified to opine.  
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4.3 TS and the City 
While TS activists experiment with alternative economic relationships and practices around 
digital technology, they do so from within localized communities. The projects discussed in this 
paper place a great importance on working “from the territory.” This is based on an 
understanding and appreciation of difference across space, and of technology as always 
entangled in the social and thus always spatialized. Yet, these projects are also highly connected 
and networked to partners, collaborators, and interlocutors around the globe—constituting what 
Stiegler (2014, 26) calls “the inscription of territory in a planetary reticularity.” 
 For instance, the technology/social work cooperative Colectic works specifically in the 
neighborhood of El Raval. As Nuria explains: “Sometimes we are asked to help facilitate some 
community process in another neighborhood, and we have to say no. We can have expertise in 
certain technologies and can maybe help in that area, but we don’t know the community. We 
don’t know their needs or issues. It wouldn’t be appropriate for us to lead a community process 
like that” (interview, 21 March 2018). Likewise, Jordi emphasizes the importance of the public 
3D printing labs being rooted in “the territory”: “Every neighborhood is different, has its own 
needs and challenges. I can’t sit here in an office and say what will work in each neighborhood. 
So we have had to work from the territory [des del territori] talking to people about what they 
need and letting them lead the process, deciding what role these technologies might play in their 
lives” (interview, 25 July 2016).  
 Projects like Guifinet and TTN actively territorialize—building and maintaining material 
infrastructures. In both cases, relationships of proximity and the physical and social 
characteristics of particular spaces dictate if and how the network can be extended. Most 
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Guifinet connections are established by antennae relaying a signal from rooftop to rooftop, 
requiring a line of sight from node to node. Take, for instance, one Guifinet member’s reflection 
on the difficulty of establishing connections in the Gothic Quarter of Barcelona: “In the Gothic 
Quarter it is really hard. It’s almost impossible to have a roof with a line of sight to another node 
because the buildings are so low and surrounded by taller ones. It’s dense, so we could run fiber 
optic cables, but there are so few actual residents now, it’s all tourists and short term rentals. 
There aren’t enough people for it to work.” (fieldnotes, 18 January 2018). The project requires 
working with the complex spatial relations in which one finds oneself, including dealing with 
neighbors who may be opposed to having an antenna on the roof of their building, a rental 
market that complicates long-term occupancy, and the particular characteristics of roofs and the 
urban landscape. As such, Guifinet is a project of actively and deliberately co-producing the 
space of the city in accordance with the lived realities and needs of local residents. Doing so 
contests the invisibilization of the “technological unconscious” and recognizes the increasing 
importance of spatialized digital infrastructures to everyday life.  
 While all of these projects are committed to working locally, many of them are also 
extensively networked beyond the city. The cooperatives discussed above often work in 
collaborative networks with free-software programmers around the world, drawing on and 
contributing to a digital commons of open-source code. Representatives from Guifinet regularly 
work with other groups interested in building their own community-managed infrastructure, such 
as when Guifi participants spent a Guifilab helping the leader of an indigenous community in the 
Ecuadorian Amazon explore the feasibility of building infrastructure to bring internet access to 
his village. The annual Mobile Social Congress includes speakers from around the world—and in 
 27 
particular from the Global South—who come to discuss issues of human rights in electronics 
manufacturing, or social and environmental effects of e-waste and mineral mining.  
 Such connections and partnerships demonstrate the potential for alternative modes of 
digital development to be both deeply territorialized and attuned to the needs and conditions of 
particular communities, while also radically open to sharing and exchanging information, 
collaborating on projects, and maintaining extensive networks of solidarity. By working from 
within localized communities and actively reshaping the spaces of the city, the TS movement 
contests hegemonic “smart city” models. Yet, most of these initiatives remain rather small—
confronting the familiar issues of scale and long-term sustainability explored in much of the 
literature on postcapitalist economies and prefigurative urban politics. For some within the TS 
community, the transformation and democratization of municipal institutions offers one potential 
opportunity to build technological sovereignty on a broader scale.  
 
4.4 Technological Sovereignty and Municipal Government  
 Emerging from a social movement base, Barcelona En Comú (“Barcelona in Common” 
in Catalan) won control of city hall in the 2015 municipal elections, led by housing activist Ada 
Colau. Since then, the municipal administration has embraced discourses of technological 
sovereignty to rethink its existing smart city program. A June 2016 op-ed by Deputy Mayor 
Gerardo Pisarello titled “Ciutats amb Sobirania Tecnològica” (El Periódico, 22 June 2016) calls 
on European cities to reject corporate prescriptions of the smart city in favor of a network of 
cities working toward TS. Meanwhile, Digital Innovation Commissioner Francesca Bria has 
become an active voice for alternative municipal technological models across Europe, leading 
the production of an “Ethical Digital Standards” municipal policy guide (Ajuntament de 
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Barcelona 2018). Situated within a broader movement around progressive “municipalism” in 
Spain and around Europe, the Colau government claims the city as the ideal site and scale from 
which to lead radical democratic reforms, including around digital technology.  
 The Barcelona en Comú government has promoted TS through a series of changes to 
municipal practices with an emphasis on free software, open-data, transparency, and citizen 
participation. The administration has begun migrating municipal computer systems away from 
proprietary software packages to open-source alternatives like LibreOffice and Linux-based 
operating systems. This migration has created 100 new permanent paid positions for local 
citizens with knowledge of open source systems and helps build and promote the broader 
community of open source software in Barcelona and beyond. The administration has also 
changed municipal contracting guidelines to give leverage to local cooperatives and firms based 
on open-source technology and social consciousness, and have implemented programs and 
subsidies to support cooperative and commons-based enterprises.  
 Decidim [We Decide] is a municipal project to create an open-source digital platform for 
citizen participation, in which citizens can make proposals and contribute to the development of 
municipal initiatives. The platform was developed by a broad community of activists and 
technologists and is now used by municipalities, cooperatives, and other organizations across 
Europe. The Ateneus de Fabricació are projects of the municipal government, receiving their 
funding from the city, while several of the collectives discussed above work out of self-managed 
community spaces owned by the municipal government. 
 Municipal support has helped promote TS initiatives and worked to imagine an 
alternative municipal model. Yet, such alliances also bring concerns and limitations. Beyond 
fears of co-optation or state surveillance, municipal priorities also change regularly with electoral 
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cycles and are limited by the structures of the institutions. As such, despite progressive changes 
since 2015, Barcelona continues to host large corporate technology events and continues to 
encourage myriad forms of investment from large technology firms, reflecting what some 
activists see as the administration’s broader failure to break with the city’s capitalist 
development model and posit a real radical alternative (Delgado 2017). At least some of the 
shortcomings of the administration stem from the lack municipal authority in relation to regional 
and national governments; while Barcelona En Comú’s lack of a majority on the city council 
further limits their ability to implement radical changes. Yet, it is also important to consider the 
limits of what can be accomplished through current forms of administrative power and the 
dangers of looking toward that state as a solution. Thus, while many projects benefit from 
municipal programs and many activists see the city as the territorial base of digital 
transformation, most TS initiatives remain autonomous.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has explored the possibilities for alternative modes of digital development in urban 
life through the example of a movement toward “technological sovereignty” in Barcelona—an 
informal network of initiatives experimenting with locally-rooted postcapitalist digital 
economies. This discussion makes several significant contributions to geographic scholarship. 
First, it moves beyond the now well-established critiques of the “smart city” to consider the ways 
traditions of prefigurative urban politics and experiments with postcapitalist economic models 
may offer possibilities for re-thinking digital urban futures. A rejection of contemporary “smart 
city” programs does not need to mean a rejection of digital innovation and development, which 
instead can become loci for imagining and building alternatives. Second, by engaging existing 
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literature on urban politics and alternative economies, I highlight the way emerging digital 
technologies open possibilities for pursing different political economic logics and experimenting 
with alternative practices. Digital technologies can facilitate new forms of political organizing 
and democratic decision-making, and can help drive new arrangements of work, property, 
production, and consumption in urban life. Further, by framing technological sovereignty as just 
one of multiple entangled “sovereignties”—conceptualized around food, energy, culture, health, 
etc.—the TS movement raises important questions about the complex, entangled, and far-
reaching nature of ongoing processes of digitalization and the dangers of leaving these processes 
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